Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court\u27s Deregulatory Turn in FEC V. Wisconsin Right to Life by Hasen, Richard L.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2008
Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's
Deregulatory Turn in FEC V. Wisconsin Right to
Life
Richard L. Hasen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hasen, Richard L., "Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC V. Wisconsin Right to Life" (2008).
Minnesota Law Review. 592.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/592
Article
Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's
Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life
Richard L. Hasent
Since 1976, the Supreme Court's approach to campaign
finance law has swung like a pendulum, with periods of Court
deference to regulation alternating with a more skeptical ap-
proach that views the First Amendment as barring much cam-
paign finance regulation.1 The end of the Rehnquist Court saw
the Court in its most deferential posture ever, with a jurispru-
dence notable not only for its deference but also for its incohe-
rence. 2 The Court, in its "New Deference" cases, 3 spoke the lan-
guage of anticorruption, but it was moving ever closer toward
endorsing an equality rationale for campaign finance regula-
t William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles. I filed a pro bono amicus brief with Professor Richard
Briffault supporting the government's position in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc. (WRTL 11), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). Brief Amici Curiae of Richard Briffault
and Richard L. Hasen in Support of Appellant and Intervenor-Appellants,
WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (Nos. 06-969, 06-970), 2007 WL 608164 [hereinafter
Brief Amici Curiae]. Thanks to Bob Bauer, Richard Briffault, Bruce Cain, Rick
Garnett, Dan Lowenstein, Roy Schotland, Brad Smith, and participants at the
American Political Science Association panel where I presented an earlier ver-
sion of this paper for useful comments and suggestions, and to Alex Chen and
John Khosravi for research assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Richard L. Hasen.
1. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 105-20 (2003)
(tracing the swings through 2002).
2. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley:
The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004).
3. See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribu-
tion and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
885, 891 (2005) (discussing the "New Deference Quartet" of Supreme Court
cases).
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tion, 4 which the Court had explicitly rejected in the 1976 Buck-
ley v. Valeo decision. 5
Now, with the replacement of Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor with Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, the pendulum has
swung sharply away from deference toward perhaps the great-
est period of deregulation we will have witnessed since before
Congress passed the important Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974.6 In 2006, the Court in Randall v. Sorrell
for the first time struck down individual contribution limits in
candidate elections as too low. 7 In 2007's FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL I),8 the Court mostly eviscerated a
key aspect of the McCain-Feingold law9 limiting corporate and
union spending in federal elections. 10 More importantly, a new
Court majority has signaled its receptivity to many more chal-
lenges to campaign finance laws.
As Part I of this Article explains, as a matter of jurispru-
dence, the Roberts Court's new approach to campaign finance
regulation is just as incoherent as the prior New Deference ap-
proach,11 though moving in a decidedly different ideological di-
rection. Likely in an effort to appear "moderate" or "minimal-
ist,"12 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have made their
deregulatory moves without expressly overturning existing
precedent, leading Justice Antonin Scalia in WRTL II to descry
Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Alito's "faux judicial re-
straint,"1 3 an approach Justice Scalia says "obfuscat[es]" 14 the
Court's sub silentio overruling of precedent. Justice Scalia is
right (if impolitely blunt): given Chief Justice Roberts's and
4. See id. at 907-08.
5. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5,
18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.).
7. 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (2006).
8. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
9. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 101, 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)
(Supp. V 2007).
10. See infra Part II.
11. For my analysis of Randall's incoherence, see generally Richard L.
Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing
After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2007).
12. These were major themes in the confirmation hearings of Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields
Questions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al.
13. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2683-84 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. Id.
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Justice Alito's views of the First Amendment and campaign
finance regulation, there is no jurisprudential reason (though
there are political reasons) for the two newest Justices not to
join Justice Scalia's concurring opinion expressly calling for
overruling of the precedent of deference.
As Part II details, however, the lack of jurisprudential con-
sistency described in Part I will be inconsequential for the poli-
tics on the ground. Beyond incoherence, the WRTL 1I principal
opinion removes effective limits on corporate and labor union
spending from their general treasury funds in elections. The
only ads that may not be paid for with such funds are those
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates for
office and those that are "susceptible of no reasonable interpre-
tation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate."'15 There are debatable issues around the edges of in-
terpreting this new test, but those disagreements are likely to
be mostly of interest to academics and to those who will delibe-
rately craft advertisements to further push the development of
deregulatory jurisprudence. The new test will not pose a for-
midable obstacle for those corporations and unions that wish to
run ads to influence elections, though it could potentially deter
some spending on the most personal of attack ads. As a result,
a significant rise in corporate election-related spending may oc-
cur.
Finally, Part III looks at the next likely challenges to cam-
paign finance regulation and how the Roberts Court is likely to
address them. Though the Roberts Court's faux minimalist ap-
proach allows for some variation in how lower courts will ad-
dress campaign finance challenges in the near term, the lower
courts' pre-McConnell'6 experience demonstrates that many
courts are likely to strike down ever more campaign finance
regulations on First Amendment grounds. Those few appellate
courts that uphold such laws likely will face Supreme Court re-
versal. There may be challenges to laws that have been upheld
by the Supreme Court in the past. For instance, laws banning
corporate and union spending from treasury funds on "express
advocacy" (such as an ad that says "Vote for Bush!"), 17 the
McCain-Feingold ban on contributing "soft money" to political
15. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion).
16. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
17. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000).
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parties,18 federal individual campaign contribution limits, 19 and
laws requiring disclosure of electioneering communications. 20 I
also expect to see challenges to laws that the Supreme Court
has not directly addressed, such as a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of contribution limits to independent expenditure
committees and "527" organizations. 21 I believe many of these
challenges will succeed.
If the current five members of the Court ruling for the
challengers in WRTL 11 remain on the Court, little will be left
of campaign finance regulation beyond campaign finance dis-
closure within a decade. Moreover, even a replacement of one of
those Justices by a Democratic president might not change the
deregulatory swing. The pendulum may be stuck in the deregu-
latory position for some time.
I. THE NEWEST CAMPAIGN FINANCE INCOHERENCE:
WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE
A. CAMPAIGN FINANCE INCOHERENCE BEFORE WISCONSIN
RIGHT TO LIFE
For more than thirty years, the Supreme Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence has been a jumble of contradictions. 22 At
issue is the clash between the public's interest in limiting the
sources and amounts of money spent on elections in order to
prevent corruption or promote political equality and the bur-
dens that such regulations place on First Amendment rights of
free speech and association. In Buckley v. Valeo, itself the
product of a compromise and drafted by a committee of Justic-
es,23 the Supreme Court established that the amounts of cam-
paign contributions could be limited to prevent corruption or
18. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 101, 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)
(Supp. V 2007).
19. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
20. See id. § 434(f)(2)(A), (B), (D) (Supp. V 2007).
21. See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem *... and the Buckley Problem,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 970-99 (2005); see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN
ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 56-64 (3d ed. Supp. 2007),
available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/2007-supp-final.pdf.
22. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 105-20 (providing an extensive review of
Supreme Court campaign finance jurisprudence); see also Hasen, supra note 2,
at 35-58.
23. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2
ELECTION L.J. 241, 241 (2003).
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the appearance of corruption. 24 However, the limits on spend-
ing of money could not be justified by an anticorruption inter-
est, because of the lack of evidence that independent spending
could corrupt candidates. Nor could the limits be justified on
equality grounds because doing so would be "wholly foreign" to
the First Amendment. 25 The Court declared that limits on the
amount of contributions only "marginally" restricted First
Amendment rights and were therefore subject to lower congres-
sional scrutiny. Spending limits, however, more directly limited
speech and were therefore subject to strict scrutiny.26
Since Buckley, the Court's jurisprudence has moved in fits
and turns. Different Court majorities have either showed defe-
rence toward legislative efforts to regulate campaign finances
or showed hostility to such regulation on First Amendment
grounds. Throughout these shifts between deference and dere-
gulation, however, the Court has yet to formally overturn any
of its campaign finance precedents.
Thus, on contributions, Buckley upheld the federal $1000
individual contribution limit.27 But despite Buckley's holding
that restrictions on the amount of contributions entail only a
marginal restriction on speech, the Court soon held that limits
on contributions to a local ballot measure committee could not
be sustained because there was no candidate to corrupt.28 Two
decades after Buckley, the Court upheld a $1075 contribution
limit in Missouri state elections against a challenge that the
amount was too low for challengers to mount an effective cam-
paign, 29 despite the fact that the $1000 limit was worth only a
fraction of the value of Buckley's $1000 contribution limit in
Buckley's 1976 dollars. 30
24. See 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976) (per curiam). By "contributions," I mean
money given to candidates or committees or money spent in coordination with
a candidate or committee. "Spending" means independent spending supporting
or opposing candidates for office.
25. See id. at 45-51.
26. See id. at 20-21, 44-51.
27. See id. at 35. The Court also upheld an aggregate annual $25,000 in-
dividual contribution limit to federal candidates, parties, and political commit-
tees. Id. at 38.
28. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-
300 (1981) ("Whatever may be the state interest.., in regulating and limiting
contributions to or expenditures of a candidate[,] . . . there is no significant
state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot meas-
ure.").
29. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382-83, 397-98 (2000).
30. See id. at 382, 395-97.
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In that case, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
the Court expressed such a deferential standard for review of a
constitutional challenge to the amount of campaign contribu-
tions31 that it was hard to see any contribution limit failing
constitutional scrutiny as too low. 32 Yet only a few years later,
after Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replaced Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, the Court, virtually
ignored but did not expressly overturn Shrink Missouri. The
Court held that Vermont's campaign contribution limits were
too low, and that the amounts needed to be high enough to al-
low for meaningful political competition. 33
The path has been equally tortured on the spending side of
the Court's jurisprudence. The Court followed Buckley's strik-
ing down of spending limits for individuals and candidates with
a ruling for entities just a few years later. In First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court struck down limits on
spending by corporations in ballot measure elections. 34 The
Court took an expansive view of corporate free speech rights.35
However, the Court dropped an important footnote suggesting
corporate spending limits in candidate elections might be per-
missible to prevent corruption of candidates. 36 This footnote is
in tension with Buckley's statement that independent spending
by individuals cannot corrupt candidates because of the ab-
sence of the possibility of a quid pro quo. 37
The Court then held in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life (MCFL) that nonprofit ideological corporations that do not
take corporate or union money cannot be limited in spending
their treasury funds in candidate elections.38 However, only a
few years later the Court confirmed that for-profit corporations
31. See id. at 386-90.
32. See Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The
Thing That Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 497 (2000).
33. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2499-500 (2006).
34. 435 U.S. 765, 767-70, 795 (1978).
35. See id. at 784-86.
36. Id. at 788 n.26.
37. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1976) (per curiam); see also
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2678 n.4 (2007)
(Scalia J., concurring) (commenting on the Bellotti footnote and stating that
"[n]o one seriously believes that independent expenditures could possibly give
rise to quid-pro-quo corruption without being subject to regulation as coordi-
nated expenditures" (discussing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26)).
38. 479 U.S. 238, 241, 263 (1986).
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could be so limited.39 The Court did not address whether corpo-
rate limits might be justified to prevent corruption of candi-
dates, as the Court had suggested in Bellotti.40 The Court did
hold that the law was justified to prevent a "different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."4 1 Though the Court called this interest one in prevent-
ing "corruption,"42 it really represented an embrace of the
equality rationale, at least as to corporations, 43 which the Court
had rejected in Buckley.44
The Court then appeared to backpedal even further from
Bellotti. In FEC v. Beaumont, the Court held that even MCFL-
type corporations could be barred from making any campaign
contributions, adding that
corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political expres-
sion, since corporations' First Amendment speech and association in-
terests are derived largely from those of their members, and of the
public in receiving information. A ban on direct corporate contribu-
tions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their
own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material in-
formation.4
5
Then, in McConnell v. FEC,46 the Court reaffirmed Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.47 The Court extended Aus-
tin's holding to unions48 without explaining why unions, which
amass wealth in a much more egalitarian way than corpora-
tions, presented the same "distortion" dangers of corporations
recognized in Austin.49 The McConnell Court said that corpora-
tions and unions could exercise their First Amendment rights
through other means, such as raising money for a separate po-
litical action committee (PAC, sometimes referred to as "sepa-
39. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55, 668-69
(1990).
40. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
41. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
42. See id. at 659-60.
43. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 111-14.
44. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
45. 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8, 162-63 (2003) (citations omitted).
46. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
47. 494 U.S. 652.
48. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205, 207-09.
49. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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rately segregated fund") that could then spend money on elec-
tion-related activities and make contributions to candidates. 50
Shrink Missouri and McConnell represented the most im-
portant in a series of New Deference cases in which the Court
continued to speak the anticorruption language of Buckley but
whose holdings appeared in serious tension with the anticor-
ruption rationale. 51 The cases were better understood as mov-
ing toward an equality rationale for campaign financing. 52 In
particular, these cases seem to endorse the "participatory self-
government" rationale for campaign finance regulation put
forward by Justice Stephen Breyer in a concurring opinion in
Shrink Missouri53 and in a chapter in his book, Active Liberty.54
Had the Court expressly adopted Justice Breyer's views,
the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence would have become
more coherent. Many would have disagreed with an adoption of
the participatory self-government rationale, but at least the
holdings of the cases would have matched up better with their
reasoning. I had speculated that the incoherence in these cases
stemmed mostly from a desire to keep Justice O'Connor in the
Court majority in these cases. She may have been reluctant,
especially given her earlier history, to expressly embrace an
equality rationale for campaign finance.5 5
With Justice O'Connor's replacement with Justice Alito, I
had suggested that major changes could take place in the
Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. 56 And indeed major
changes seem afoot. But it also appears that incoherence con-
tinues to define the Court in this area. In the Roberts Court's
first major campaign finance decision, Randall v. Sorrell,57 the
50. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-06; see also Richard L. Hasen, Justice
Souter: Campaign Finance Law's Emerging Egalitarian, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV.
169, 183-87 (2008) (discussing the regulation of labor unions under egalitarian
views of campaign finance regulation).
51. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 31-34, 42-43.
52. See id. at 31, 57-60.
53. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400-01 (2000) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
54. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 39-55 (2005).
55. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 32 n.7.
56. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Elec-
tion Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 676-78 (2006).
57. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006). The Court did decide one campaign finance
case with Chief Justice Roberts, but not Justice Alito, on the Court. That was
the first WRTL case. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL I), 546 U.S.
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Court split three ways in considering whether Vermont's cam-
paign spending limits were too low. Three Justices would have
upheld the limits, 58 three would have ruled that virtually all
campaign finance limits violate the First Amendment, 59 and
Justice Breyer, joined by the two newest Justices, struck down
the limits on grounds that they were too low to allow adequate
political competition.60 The Court's Randall decision was both
inconsistent with earlier campaign finance and election law
cases on the issue, as well as internally inconsistent, using
competition only selectively as a constitutional touchstone and
imposing a test for the constitutionality of campaign contribu-
tion limits that would be difficult to apply in a consistent way.61
It had the feel of an opinion from the Court in transition.62
As will be demonstrated, WRTL 11 shows the emergence of
a new Court majority, one tending much more toward the First
Amendment deregulatory position. But WRTL 11 did not adopt
the coherent, if also controversial, deregulationist position of
Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas (and now perhaps Justice
Anthony Kennedy), which views virtually all contribution and
spending limits as unconstitutional. Rather WRTL II purports
to explain its radical holding as in harmony with the more de-
ferential cases to have come before it. Before turning to that in-
coherence, I place the WRTL 11 controversy in context.
B. PUTTING WRTL IIIN CONTEXT: MCCAIN-FEINGOLD,
MCCONNELL, AND THE PAC REQUIREMENT FOR CORPORATE AND
UNION EXPRESS ADVOCACY AND ELECTIONEERING
COMMUNICATIONS
The origins of the dispute at issue in WRTL reach back to
even before the 1976 Buckley opinion.6 3 In the Federal Election
410 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text
(explaining the procedural history of the WRTL decisions).
58. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2501-02 (Thomas, J, con-
curring).
60. Id. at 2485, 2498-95, 2499 (plurality opinion).
61. See Hasen, supra note 11, at 869-78.
62. See id. at 890 ("Randall may turn out to be a blip before a dramatic
shift on the Court toward deregulation or, less likely, back toward the New
Deference. But despite the swings in the past and the potential for future
swings, the one consistent feature of the Court's campaign finance jurispru-
dence has been incoherence. Unfortunately, Randall does nothing to improve
the Court's jurisprudence on that score.").
63. Portions of the next few paragraphs are drawn from Richard L. Ha-
sen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Con-
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Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974,64 The amend-
ments limited any spending "relative to a clearly identified
candidate [in federal elections]" 65 and required "'[e]very per-
son... who makes contributions or expenditures'... 'for the
purpose of ... influencing' the nomination or election of candi-
dates for federal office" 66 to disclose the source of such contribu-
tions and expenditures. 67 The Buckley Court recognized a va-
gueness problem; people engaging in political speech might well
not know if the statutes cover their conduct. 68 Vague statutes
raise due process issues69 and First Amendment concerns. 70
To deal with vagueness, the Court construed the statutes
as reaching only "communications that in express terms advo-
cate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."71
Such express advocacy required definite words "of advocacy of
election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your
ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or] 're-
ject."'72 Still, the Court struck down the spending limits as vi-
olating the First Amendment, 73 though it upheld the disclosure
requirements.74
Buckley thus left advertisements intended to or likely to in-
fluence the outcome of an election, but lacking words of express
advocacy as unregulated by FECA. These advertisements were
referred to as "issue advocacy,"75 even though the prime issue
at stake in many of these advertisements was the election or
defeat of a candidate.76 Advertisements lacking express advoca-
stitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1775-77 (2001).
64. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5,
18, 26, and 47 U.S.C.).
65. Id. sec. 101(a), § 608(e)(1), 88 Stat. at 1265 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1975) (repealed 1976)); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 41 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)).
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (Supp. IV
1975)).
67. See id. at 74-75, 77.
68. See id. at 40-44, 76-78.
69. Id. at 77.
70. See id. at 40-41.
71. Id. at 44; see also id. at 80 (construing the term "expenditure" to have
the same meaning in 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) as the Court earlier construed it in 18
U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1975) (repealed 1976)).
72. Id. at 44 n.52.
73. See id. at 48-51.
74. See id. at 80-82.
75. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003).
76. See id. at 126-27.
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cy but criticizing a member of Congress in the weeks before the
election could be paid for with corporate or union funds-
indeed, it was not necessary to disclose the source of funding. 77
The conduct escapes FECA because it avoided magic words. 78
Sham issue advocacy became increasingly important in
federal elections, with spending hitting as much as $150 mil-
lion in 1996 on such advertisements. 79 The figure reached at
least $275 million during the 1998 election.80 By the 2000 elec-
tion cycle, it rose to $509 million.81
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)82
(more commonly known as McCain-Feingold for its two leading
Senate sponsors) sought to regulate this so-called sham issue
advocacy through a new "electioneering communications" test.8 3
Under the BCRA, corporations and unions may not spend gen-
eral treasury funds, but may spend PAC funds, on "electioneer-
ing communication[s]."s 4 An electioneering communication "en-
compasses any broadcast, cable or satellite communication that
refers to a candidate for federal office and that is aired within
thirty days of a federal primary election or sixty days of a fed-
eral general election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate
is running for office."85 Thus, under section 203 of the BCRA, a
corporation or union could not use treasury funds to pay for a
television advertisement broadcast shortly before the election
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADvo.
CACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (1997), available at http://
www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/PoliticalCommunication/A
dvertisingResearch_1997/REP16.pdf.
80. See JEFFREY D. STANGER & DOUGLAS G. RIVLIN, ANNENBERG PUB.
POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1997-1998 ELEC-
TION CYCLE (1998), http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/CLR/
100CLR620/report.htm.
81. See Lorie Slass, Spending on Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Cycle, in AN.
NENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION
CYCLE 3, 4 (2001), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
Downloads/PoliticalCommunication/IssueAdInl9992000Election/2001
19992000issueadvocacy.pdf; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 n.20 (citing
Slass, supra, at 1-15).
82. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
18, 28, 36 and 47 U.S.C.).
83. See Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Va-
leo to FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2006-
2007, at 77, 77 (Mark K. Moller ed., 2007) (footnote omitted).
84. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
85. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2007)
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2007)).
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criticizing Senator Smith by name for her lousy Medicare
plan.8 6
The BCRA's electioneering communications test solved the
vagueness problem (the test is easy to apply and does not in-
volve any guesswork), but it introduced a potential problem of
overbreadth. An advertisement might not be intended to or
likely to affect the outcome of the election, and still the adver-
tisement would fall within the bright-line electioneering com-
munications test section 203 of the BCRA. Thus, a television
advertisement that a corporation would like to run shortly be-
fore the election urging the President running for reelection to
intervene in a labor dispute could not be paid for with general
treasury funds.
In McConnell v. FEC, plaintiffs argued that section 203
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it captured too much
"genuine issue advocacy."8 7 The three-judge district court panel
hearing McConnell considered in detail the relevance of two so-
cial science studies (the "Buying Time" studies) 8 8 examining the
question.8 9 The judges differed on the report's findings and sig-
nificance. One judge found that between 14.70% and 17.00% of
the ads run before the 1998 and 2000 elections were genuine
issue advertisements. 90 A second judge disagreed with both the
17.00% figure as well as its legal significance. 91 A third judge
pegged the amount of such ads between 11.38% and 50.50%
and, concluded that the law was overbroad. 92
The Supreme Court majority opinion in McConnell none-
theless devoted only a single paragraph to this issue. In lan-
guage that later proved to be key to the WRTL II case, the
Court explained why the BCRA's electioneering communica-
86. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
87. 540 U.S. 93, 204-07 (2003). The following few paragraphs are drawn
from Hasen, supra note 2, at 52-56.
88. See generally CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. McLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000
FEDERAL ELECTIONS (2001); JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BREN-
NAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2000).
89. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 307-12, 367-73 (D.D.C. 2003)
(Henderson, J., concurring), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); id.
at 610-39, 719-52 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring); id. at 792-99, 890-918
(Leon, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 798 (Leon, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 636 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 372 n.149 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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tions test could constitutionally cover corporate and union
broad advertisements that lacked words of express advocacy:
This argument [that the government's compelling interest in regulat-
ing issue advocacy does not apply to "electioneering communications"]
fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast during the [thirty] and
[sixty] day periods preceding federal primary and general elections
are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications
for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired dur-
ing those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' deci-
sions and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads that
clearly identified a candidate and were aired during those relatively
brief preelection timespans but had no electioneering purpose is a
matter of dispute between the parties and among the judges on the
District Court. Nevertheless, the vast majority of ads clearly had such
a purpose. Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been
in the past, in the future corporations and unions may finance ge-
nuine issue ads during those timeframes by simply avoiding any spe-
cific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for
the ad from a segregated fund.93
McConnell left open the question whether a corporation or
union could bring an "as applied" challenge to section 203 of the
BCRA by proving that a broadcast advertisement the entity
wished to pay for from its general treasury funds was a "ge-
nuine issue advertisement" and therefore not subject to the
BCRA's restrictions. In 2004, it was not clear that McConnell
allowed such an as-applied challenge. 94 WRTL was a test case
meant to push the question.
C. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE'S FURTHER INCOHERENCE
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. "is a nonprofit, nonstock, ideo-
logical advocacy corporation" recognized as tax exempt by the
Internal Revenue Service. 95 In late July 2004, likely as a test
case to push the as-applied question, WRTL began running a
few television advertisements in Wisconsin opposing the Senate
filibuster of some federal judicial nominations and urging vot-
ers to "Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to
oppose the filibuster."9 6 Two days later, WRTL filed suit in fed-
93. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 (citations omitted).
94. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 55.
95. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 11), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660
(2007).
96. Id. The full text of one of the ads, "Wedding," reads as follows:
"PASTOR: And who gives this woman to be married to this man?
'BRIDE'S FATHER: Well, as father of the bride, I certainly could. But
instead, I'd like to share a few tips on how to properly install drywall.
Now you put the drywall up...
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eral court 97 seeking a declaration and an injunction that it
could run the ads and pay for them from its general treasury
funds as "genuine issue ads," despite the fact that Senator Russ
Feingold was running unopposed in a primary in mid-
September. 98 WRTL did not want to use its PAC funds to pay
for the ads, and it could not take advantage of the MCFL ex-
emption for ideological corporations because the organization
took over $315,000 in donations from for-profit corporations to
pay for the ads.99
1. WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE'S HOLDING
The three-judge federal district court denied WRTL's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, ruling that McConnell forec-
losed all as-applied challenges.100 The district court later dis-
missed WRTL's complaint, 101 and the organization appealed to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard oral argument
just as Justice O'Connor was completing her term on the
Court,102 and issued a unanimous per curiam opinion just six
'VOICE-OVER: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important de-
cision.
'But in Washington it's happening. A group of Senators is using the fi-
libuster delay tactic to block federal judicial nominees from a simple
'yes' or 'no' vote. So qualified candidates don't get a chance to serve.
'It's politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up some of our
courts to a state of emergency.
'Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the fili-
buster.
'Visit: BeFair.org
'Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life (befair.org), which is responsible
for the content of this advertising and not authorized by any candi-
date or candidate's committee."'
Id. (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198 n.3
(D.D.C. 2006), aff'd 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)). The text of the other two WRTL
advertisements were similar. See id. at 2660-61.
97. See id. at 2660-61. Under a special provision of the BCRA, WRTL
sought relief from a special three-judge court, with direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court. See id. at 2661; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 § 403, 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (2000 & Supp. V 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
98. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2661, 2663.
99. See id. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2673 n.10 (prin-
cipal opinion) (refusing to pass on the argument that the Austin interest in
preventing corruption does not apply to a nonprofit advocacy organization
such as WRTL "because WRTL's funds for its ads were not derived solely from
individual contributions").
100. See id. at 2661 (principal opinion).
101. Id.
102. Linda Greenhouse, Court Opens Campaign Law to Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A16. During that argument, Chief Justice Roberts
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days after oral argument (WRTL /).103 The Court held that
McConnell did not preclude as-applied challenges, and re-
manded the case to the three-judge district court.104
On remand, the district court sided with WRTL. It first re-
jected an argument that the case was moot on grounds that the
issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 105 On the
merits, the district court split 2-1. Two of the judges, including
Judge Richard Leon (one of the three district court judges in
McConnell), held that WRTL was entitled to an as-applied ex-
emption. 10 6 The majority adopted an acontextual test that
looked only at the "four corners of the ads" without any context,
such as the fact that the WRTL actively opposed Senator Fein-
gold and his position on the filibuster of President George W.
Bush's nominees.10 7 Because the majority viewed the ads to be
something besides the functional equivalent of express advoca-
cy, WRTL was entitled to an exemption. 108 The dissenting
judge, examining the context, thought that there was a genuine
issue of material effect as to the ads' purposes and effects that
should preclude summary judgment. 0 9
The Supreme Court took the case on appeal and divided in-
to three camps. 110 Three Justices (Justice Scalia, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas) took the position that Austin and
McConnell were wrongly decided and should be overturned."'
This position meant that WRTL could not only pay for these ads
from its treasury funds, but that corporations and unions could
pay from such funds for any election-related advertisements, in-
stated to the Solicitor General defending the law that "[iun McConnell against
FEC, you stood there and told us that this was a facial challenge and that as-
applied challenges could be brought in the future. This is an as-applied chal-
lenge and now you're telling us that it's already been decided. It's a classic bait
and switch." Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC
(WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam).
103. See Greenhouse, supra note 102.
104. See WRTL I, 546 U.S. at 412.
105. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D.D.C.
2006), aff'd 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
106. See id. at 210.
107. Id. at 205-08.
108. Id. at 208, 210.
109. Id. at 219 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
110. All the Justices agreed that the case was not moot. See FEC v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 11), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662-63 (2007); id. at 2687 n.1
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the four dissenting Justices found the
case justiciable "[s]ubstantially for the reasons stated by the Court").
111. See id. at 2674-87 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cluding those containing express advocacy. 112 Four Justices dis-
sented (Justice David Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Ste-
vens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Breyer), believing that
WRTL's ads, viewed in context, were indistinguishable from the
kinds of advertising the Court in McConnell held it was per-
missible to regulate through a corporate PAC requirement.1 1 3
The decisive votes in the case belonged to the two newest
Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. The Chief
Justice wrote an opinion (referred to by the Court as the "prin-
cipal opinion") joined in full by Justice Alito, holding that
WRTL was entitled to an as-applied exemption for its adver-
tisements, but not reaching the question whether Austin or
McConnell should be overruled. 114 Justice Alito wrote a one pa-
ragraph concurring opinion reiterating the holding of the prin-
cipal opinion and adding that
it is unnecessary to go further and decide whether § 203 is unconsti-
tutional on its face. If it turns out that the implementation of the as-
applied standard set out in the principal opinion impermissibly chills
political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future case to re-
consider the holding in McConnell that § 203 is facially constitution-
al.115
Given its middle position between the opinions of Justices
Scalia and Souter, the principal opinion is decisive here, mean-
ing that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito now control the
direction of campaign finance law on the Court.116 For this rea-
son, I focus the remainder of this Article on the principal opi-
nion (and Justice Alito's concurrence). I explore the coherence
of the Court's analysis in WRTL II, the likely political effects of
112. See id.
113. See id. at 2687-705 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent is
quite interesting in its own right and is worthy of more extended considera-
tion. See Hasen, supra note 50, at 181-92.
114. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2658-74 (principal opinion).
115. Id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. at
2670 n.8 (principal opinion) ("[I]n deciding this as-applied challenge, we have
no occasion to revisit McConnell's conclusion that the statute is not facially
overbroad."); id. at 2674 ("McConnell held that express advocacy of a candi-
date or his opponent by a corporation shortly before an election may be prohi-
bited, along with the functional equivalent of such express advocacy. We have
no occasion to revisit that decision today.").
116. WRTL II is one of the rare cases from the Court's 2006 term in which
Justice Kennedy did not find himself in the middle of the Court. Cf. Linda
Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Ju-
ly 3, 2007, at All ("A new dynamic emerged in the court's last term, which
ended last week with Justice Kennedy standing in the middle, all alone. Not
only the lawyers, but also the [J]ustices themselves, are now in the business of
courting him.").
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the decision on corporate and union involvement in the elector-
al process, and the likely future direction of the Court's cam-
paign finance jurisprudence.
2. WRTL 11's Principal Opinion
After resolving the mootness question, 117 the principal opi-
nion then turned to the merits. The FEC and members of Con-
gress who intervened in the case to support the FEC argued
that WRTL should have the burden of proving that the BCRA
was unconstitutional as applied to its ads. 118 The principal opi-
nion disagreed, declaring that "[b]ecause BCRA [section] 203
burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny."" 9 The
opinion then noted that the Court in McConnell "has already
ruled that the BCRA survives strict scrutiny to the extent it re-
gulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent."'120 But if
the ads were not express advocacy or its equivalent, "the Gov-
ernment's task is more formidable. It must then demonstrate
that banning such ads during the blackout periods is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling [state] interest."'121
The principal opinion next considered whether the WRTL
ads were the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy (there
was no question the ads themselves contained no express advo-
cacy). The principal opinion rejected the idea that McConnell
had endorsed a test based upon whether the advertisement was
intended to or likely to affect a federal election. 122 Delving into
the controversial Buying Time studies, 123 the principal opinion
argued that the reference to "intent and effect" in the McCon-
nell majority opinion appeared to be derived from the tests ap-
plied by student coders in the Buying Time studies to deter-
mine the difference between genuine and sham issue ads. 124 It
then rejected the idea that an "intent-and-effect" test could be
consistent with the First Amendment, especially "given that
117. That part of the principal opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas. See WRTL I, 127 S. Ct. at 2658, 2662-63.
118. Id. at 2663-64.
119. Id. at 2664.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. Recall that in McConnell, the Court declared that "[t]he justifi-
cations for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired dur-
ing those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and
have that effect." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
123. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
124. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
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the methodology, data, and conclusions of the two studies were
the subject of serious dispute among the [McConnell] District
Court judges." 125
The principal opinion further opined that Buckley itself
had "rejected an intent-and-effect test" in its initial analysis of
FECA.126 The principal opinion held than an intent test "would
chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every
ad within the terms of [section] 203 .... No reasonable speaker
would choose to run an ad covered by the BCRA if its only de-
fense to a criminal prosecution would be that its motives were
pure." 127 It also rejected an effects test as putting the speaker
"wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hear-
ers" and would "typically lead to a burdensome, expert-driven
inquiry, with an indeterminate result."' 28
The principal opinion then set forth the appropriate test
for an as-applied challenge, which it apparently conflated with
the question of the meaning of the term "functional equivalent
of express advocacy."'129 It declared that the proper standard
"must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communi-
cation rather than amorphous considerations of intent and ef-
fect."1 30 To avoid chilling speech, there must be minimal, if any
discovery, and there cannot be 'the open-ended rough-and-
tumble of factors,' which 'invit[e] complex argument in a trial
court and a virtually inevitable appeal. In short, it must give
the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling
speech."' 131
125. Id. at 2665 n.4; see also id. at 2665 ("The fact that the student coders
who helped develop the evidentiary record before the Court in McConnell
looked to intent and effect in doing so, and that the Court dealt with the
record on that basis in deciding the facial overbreadth claim, neither compels
nor warrants accepting that same standard as the constitutional test for sepa-
rating, in an as-applied challenge, political speech protected under the First
Amendment from that which may be banned."). The dissenters also distanced
themselves from the methodology of the Buying Time studies. See id. at 2701
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("To be clear, I am not endorsing the precise methodol-
ogy of those studies (and THE CHIEF JUSTICE is correct that we did not do
so in McConnell[)] .... " (citation omitted)).
126. Id. at 2665 (principal opinion). The dissent responded by noting that
Buckley appeared to endorse the PAC alternative to deal with any problems in
"doubtful" cases. See id. at 2700 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2665-66 (principal opinion).
128. Id. at 2666.
129. Id. at 2667.
130. Id. at 2666.
131. Id. at 2666-67 (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock, Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)) (alteration in original).
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The principal opinion then declared its own test, which is
worth exploring in some detail: "[A] court should find that an
ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the
ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as
an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."132 In a
later footnote responding to Justice Scalia's contention that this
test was impermissibly vague, the principal opinion elaborated:
[W]e agree with Justice SCALIA on the imperative for clarity in this
area; that is why our test affords protection unless an ad is suscepti-
ble of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate. It is why we emphasize that (1) there
can be no free-ranging intent-and-effect test; (2) there generally
should be no discovery or inquiry into the sort of "contextual" factors
highlighted by the FEC and intervenors; (3) discussion of issues can-
not be banned merely because the issues might be relevant to an elec-
tion; and (4) in a debatable case, the tie is resolved in favor of protect-
ing speech. 133
The principal opinion found that context should "seldom
play a significant role" in an as-applied challenge, adding that
[c]ourts need not ignore basic background information that may be
necessary to put an ad in context-such as whether an ad "describes a
legislative issue that is either currently the subject of legislative scru-
tiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near future,"-
but the need to consider such background should not become an
excuse for discovery or a broader inquiry of the sort we have just
noted raises First Amendment concerns.134
The principal opinion rejected the contention that its test
was inconsistent with McConnell:
The McConnell Court did not find that a "vast majority" of the issue
ads considered were the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Rather, it found that such ads had an "electioneering purpose." For
the reasons we have explained, "purpose" is not the appropriate test
for distinguishing between genuine issue ads and the functional
equivalent of express campaign advocacy. 135
Applying its "no reasonable interpretation" test to the
WRTL ads, the principal opinion unsurprisingly concluded that
WRTL's ads were not the functional equivalent of express advo-
cacy and therefore entitled to an as-applied exemption:
First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The
ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort
the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact public
officials with respect to the matter. Second, their content lacks indicia
132. Id. at 2667.
133. Id. at 2669 n.7.
134. Id. at 2669 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 2670 n.8. The principal opinion added its view that the "vast
majority" language was dicta and not binding on the Court. See id.
1082 [92:1064
BEYOND INCOHERENCE
of express advocacy: The ads do not mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger; and they do not take a position on a
candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office.1 36
Justice Souter argued that the WRTL ad was indistin-
guishable from a hypothetical ad discussed in McConnell that
"condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before ex-
horting viewers to 'call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think."' 137 In response, the principal opinion said that WRTL's
ads "did not" condemn Senator Feingold's record, but "instead
t[ook] a position on the filibuster issue and exhort[ed] constitu-
ents to contact Senators Feingold and Kohl to advance that po-
sition."'38 The Court rejected attempts of the FEC and the in-
tervenors to show that the ads were the functional equivalent
of express advocacy, taking into account various pieces of con-
textual information. For example, the ads referenced WRTL's
website, which included information on the Senators' position
on filibusters "and allowed visitors to sign up for 'e-alerts,' some
of which contained exhortations to vote against Senator Fein-
gold."'139 Pointing to a survey of widespread voter ignorance
about politics, the principal opinion rejected Justice Souter's
dissenting argument that anyone who heard the WRTL ads
would know the message was a vote against Feingold. 140
The principal opinion concluded that "[a]t best" the FEC
and intervenors' evidence showed the murky line between elec-
tion and issue-related speech: "Discussion of issues cannot be
suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in
an election. Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie
goes to the speaker, not the censor."'141
The final portion of the principal opinion rejected the con-
tention, not advanced by either the FEC or the intervenors,
that the WRTL ads could be subject to the PAC requirement
even if they did not contain the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. In this discussion, the principal opinion reasserted
Bellotti's contention that corporate political speech is entitled to
great constitutional protection, and declared "[e]nough is
136. Id. at 2667.
137. See id. at 2667 n.6, 2684 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126-27 (2003)).
138. Id. at 2667 n.6 (principal opinion).
139. Id. at 2669.
140. Id. at 2667 n.6.
141. Id. at 2669; see also id. at 2674 ("[When it comes to defining what
speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to
such a ban[,] . . . we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.").
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enough" in rejecting the contention that WRTL's ads are
"equivalent to contributions."'142 It also strongly rejected the an-
ticircumvention rationale for campaign finance regulation-
that the government should be able to regulate a large amount
of campaign financing in order to prevent evasion of a law's
core provisions143-which played such a central role in the New
Deference cases.144 It added, "We hold that the interest recog-
nized in Austin as justifying regulation of corporate campaign
speech and extended in McConnell to the functional equivalent
of such speech has no application to issue advocacy of the sort
engaged in by WRTL."'14
Finally, the Court rejected the idea that the PAC alterna-
tive was sufficiently speech protective of the rights of corpora-
tions and unions:
PACs impose well-documented and onerous burdens, particularly on
small nonprofits. McConnell did conclude that segregated funds "pro-
vid[e] corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient op-
portunity to engage in express advocacy" and its functional equiva-
lent, but that holding did not extend beyond functional equivalents-
and if it did, the PAC option would justify regulation of all corporate
speech, a proposition we have rejected. 146
D. WRTL's INCOHERENCE
I have consistently criticized the New Deference campaign
finance opinions of the Supreme Court as lacking in cohe-
rence.147 In those cases, the results reached by the Court were
often at odds with the analysis the Court offered and inconsis-
tent with prior case law. This incoherence was not inevitable.
As I have argued, the Court could have reached much the same
results, without such incoherence, had it explicitly adopted
142. Id. at 2672. The parties did not make the argument, but rather argued
"that an expansive definition of 'functional equivalent' is needed to ensure that
issue advocacy does not circumvent the rule against express advocacy, which
in turn helps protect against circumvention of the rule against contributions."
Id. The Court read this argument as stating that WRTL's ads are equivalent
to contributions, and added the following: "But such a prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict
scrutiny." Id.
143. See id. at 2672-73.
144. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 45-46, 48-52; Hasen, supra note 3, at
904-05.
145. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2673.
146. Id. at 2671 n.9 (citations omitted). The principal opinion also rejected
the idea that a corporate speaker could use a newspaper ad or website, or
change the content of its speech, to avoid the reach of section 203. Id.
147. For the most sustained argument, see Hasen, supra note 2, passim.
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Justice Breyer's "participatory self-government" approach to
the campaign finance cases. 148 It would have created a juri-
sprudence that would have been not only more honest, but also
easier to apply in other campaign finance cases.
Similarly, the principal opinion in WRTL II is incoherent,
for reasons I explain below. This incoherence was also not in-
evitable. The Court could have reached virtually the same re-
sults it did in WRTL II, without such incoherence, had it expli-
citly adopted the First Amendment deregulatory position of
Justices Scalia and Thomas 149 or of Justice Kennedy. 150 That
too would have created a more honest and more easily applied
campaign finance jurisprudence. But instead the Court pur-
ported to resolve the issue in WRTL II without overturning a
single precedent, creating even more incoherence. The principal
opinion is all the more stark because it gave a ruling even
broader than the plaintiff requested.
The principal opinion's jurisprudence is incoherent in at
least four respects: (1) Most importantly, the principal opinion's
analysis and tone is utterly incompatible with the Court's ap-
proach to the constitutionality of section 203 of the BCRA set
forth in McConnell. (2) The principal opinion is inconsistent
with the Court's prior approach to corporate political spending
in candidate elections as set forth in Austin and Beaumont, and
148. See id. at 60-67.
149. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2674-75.
150. In the past, Justice Kennedy has taken a position on campaign finance
regulation not quite as deregulationist as Justices Thomas and Scalia. While
Justice Kennedy agreed with these Justices in McConnell that Austin should
be overruled, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 323 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring), he parted company with them in voting to uphold one of the BCRA's soft
money provisions, see id. at 308 (suggesting that he might still be willing to
uphold some contribution limits). He also left open the possibility of recogniz-
ing a new rationale for expenditure limits. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For now, however, I would
leave open the possibility that Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a
system in which there are some limits on both expenditures and contributions,
thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official
duties rather than on fundraising."). He later seems to have abandoned this
position. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2501 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("The Court decides the constitutionality of the limitations Vermont
places on campaign expenditures and contributions. I agree that both limita-
tions violate the First Amendment."). His decision to sign Justice Scalia's opi-
nion in WRTL II is a further signal that Justice Kennedy is moving closer to
the Thomas-Scalia position. For more on Justice Thomas's campaign finance
jurisprudence, see Richard L. Hasen, Justice Thomas: Leading the Way to
Campaign Finance Deregulation, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. ONLINE, Oct. 8,
2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=18958.
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reaffirmed in McConnell. The principal opinion compounds the
inconsistency by misstating the holding of Bellotti. (3) The
principal opinion completely ignores the "competitiveness" ap-
proach to campaign finance law set out only a year earlier in
Randall. (4) Though the principal opinion rejects an "effects"
test for separating regulable from nonregulable corporate elec-
tion advertising, its own no-reasonable-interpretation test is it-
self an effects test. I consider each of these in turn.
1. Inconsistency with the Tone and Holding of McConnell
The principal opinion is written in a lawyerly and sophisti-
cated way to make it appear as though it is consistent with
McConnell and other the earlier campaign cases. Beneath the
veneer, however, is an opinion whose heart is wholly aligned
with the deregulationist approach but whose words fail to
match up with its intention. Its holding turns McConnell on its
head.
It is worth beginning with the principal opinion's tone,
which is important not only for how lower courts will apply the
new as-applied exception to section 203 but also for how courts
will address other campaign finance questions (an issue I re-
turn to in Part III). The contrast between the Court's view of
campaign finance regulation in McConnell and in WRTL 11 is
stark. The McConnell opinion was full of language about legis-
lative deference, flexibility, political reality, and the need to
give Congress the room to address campaign finance problems
step-by-step. 15 1 It gave a long and fawning history tracing con-
gressional efforts to limit big money, and especially corporate
election spending, in the federal electoral process. 152 It spoke of
the ease of evading campaign finance laws, and the need for
courts to take a functional, not formal, view of what counts as
election-related speech. 153 It minimized First Amendment con-
cerns by noting alternative means for corporate influence over
the electoral process, including PAC requirements, alternative
means of communications, or even changing the content of the
151. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137 ('The less rigorous standard of
review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's 'closely drawn' scruti-
ny) shows proper deference to Congress'[s] ability to weigh competing constitu-
tional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also pro-
vides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns
about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the po-
litical process.").
152. See id. at 115-33.
153. See id. at 206.
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electoral message such as by omitting the name of the candi-
date mentioned in the advertisement. 154
The tone of the principal opinion in WRTL II is the polar
opposite of McConnell. There is no nod to legislative deference
or recognition of Congress's need to react to the "hydraulic" ef-
fect of money. Rather than talk of a PAC alternative, the WRTL
II principal opinion mentions a free speech "ban" (or variations
on the word "ban") twelve times and a speech "blackout" seven-
teen times. It refers to corporate election broadcasting paid for
from treasury funds as a "crime" twice. 155 Contrast McConnell's
treatment of the PAC requirement: "Because corporations can
still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is
'simply wrong' to view the provision as a 'complete ban' on ex-
pression rather than a regulation."156
The WRTL II principal opinion makes no mention of con-
gressional deference (nor does it use the term "loophole," a term
appearing ten times in the McConnell joint majority opinion), 157
but the term "First Amendment" appears eighteen times and
variations on the word "censor" three times.1 58 In contrast, the
discussion of section 203 in McConnell's joint majority opinion
mentioned the First Amendment merely three times, and never
to celebrate the free speech principles behind the Amend-
ment.1 59 Describing the First Amendment principles, the WRTL
II principal opinion states that "the First Amendment requires
us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than
suppressing it[J"160 that "[w]here the First Amendment is im-
154. See id.
155. These figures come from a word search I performed on electronic cop-
ies of FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 11), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
156. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
157. This figure comes from a word search I performed on electronic copies
of McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
158. These figures come from a word search I performed on electronic cop-
ies of WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652.
159. These figures come from a word search I performed on electronic cop-
ies of McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; see also id. at 205 ("In that light, we must ex-
amine the degree to which the BCRA burdens First Amendment expression
and evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that bur-
den .... After all, 'the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,' and
'[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less
entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of polit-
ical policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation."' (cita-
tions omitted)); id. at 208 ('The statute's narrow exception is wholly consistent
with First Amendment principles.").
160. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.
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plicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor[;]' 161 and
that the Court must "give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not
censorship. The First Amendment's command that 'Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech' de-
mands at least that."162 The principal opinion and Justice Ali-
to's separate concurrence also stressed that McConnell's hold-
ing itself could well be reexamined in a future case if the new
as-applied exemption recognized in WRTL II insufficiently pro-
tects the First Amendment. 163
Beyond tone, the principal opinion, for good or for bad, ef-
fectively eviscerates McConnell's holding that it is generally
permissible for Congress, under section 203 of the BCRA, to re-
quire corporations and unions to pay for "electioneering com-
munications" from a PAC. Both Justice Scalia's concurring opi-
nion and Justice Souter's dissenting opinion recognized that
the principal opinion effectively overruled McConnell on this
point, leading Justice Scalia to descry the "faux judicial re-
straint" of the principal opinion.16 4
161. Id. at 2669.
162. Id. at 2674.
163. Id. (noting that the Court "today" has no occasion to revisit McCon-
nell's upholding of a facial challenge to section 203 of the BCRA); id. (Alito, J.,
concurring) (leaving the question open in the event the WRTL decision is in-
sufficiently speech-protective).
164. Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he principal opinion's at-
tempt at distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive enough, and the change in
the law it works is substantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, hav-
ing widely divergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions
at issue, agree that the opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying
so."); id. at 2703 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he operative opinion produces the
result of overruling McConnell's holding on section 203, less than four years in
the Reports."); see also BeVier, supra note 83, at 99 ("[A]lthough it is true that
Chief Justice Roberts did not explicitly overrule McConnell, his opinion seems
to have sustained an as-applied challenge to the BCRA in First Amendment
terms even broader than either WRTL had originally sought or many of its
amici had advocated.").
In making his argument that the principal opinion effectively overrules
McConnell, Justice Souter noted that when the BCRA was passed, Congress,
concerned that its electioneering communications provision might be struck
down as unconstitutional, included a backup definition to be applied in such
instances. That backup definition treated as an electioneering communication
any broadcast, cable or satellite communication which promotes or
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate
for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is sugges-
tive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or
against a specific candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2007). Justice Souter wrote that "[t]his
backup sounds familiar because it is essentially identical to THE CHIEF
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As will be clear from Part II, it is a bit hyperbolic to claim
that WRTL II completely overruled McConnell. There are some
electioneering communications under which there is "no rea-
sonable interpretation" that the advertisement is about a legis-
lative issue, not an election. For example, consider a television
advertisement paid for with corporate funds shortly before the
election: "Jane Doe wants to be your president, but Jane Doe is
an evil person. Don't let her ruin the world." But it is fair to say
that the principal opinion in WRTL II effectively overruled
McConnell. As Part II shows, any corporation consulting an
election lawyer will be able to craft an ad that escapes coverage
under section 203 of the BCRA because it is possible to build
into the ad some reasonable interpretation that the ad is about
a legislative issue. For example: "Jane Doe wants to be your
president, but Jane Doe's position on global warming is evil.
Don't let her ruin the world."
By putting the burden of proof on the government to prove
that a corporate- or union-funded electioneering communica-
tion is the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy and then
putting forth a test for "functional equivalence" that sweeps
most such advertising out of the ambit of the PAC requirement,
WRTL II has turned the campaign finance world, created by
the BCRA and upheld in McConnell, upside down. Rather than
most electioneering communications being subject to section
203, WRTL II mandates that most such communications be ex-
empted from section 203.
Importantly, the principal opinion treats McConnell's
analysis of the extent of the issue advocacy problem which
Congress was addressing as irrelevant:
JUSTICE's test for evaluating an as-applied challenge to the original defini-
tion of 'electioneering communication' .... Thus does the principal opinion in-
stitute the very standard that would have prevailed if the Court formally over-
ruled McConnell." WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 2680 (remarking that the principal opinion's test "bear[s] a strong like-
ness to the BCRA's backup definition"); Posting of Allison R. Hayward to
Skeptic's Eye, http://skepticseye.com/2007/06/furgatch-returns-right (June 26,
2006, 09:09 EST) (arguing that the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's
"one plausible meaning" test for express advocacy, defined in FEC v. Furgatch,
807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Though the backup definition and the principal opinion's test for as-
applied challenges are similar (as is the Furgatch test), there are differences
between them. Most importantly, the backup definition requires words of sup-
port or opposition, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii), whereas WRTL II's no-
reasonable-interpretation test does not expressly do so. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at
2667 (principal opinion). It may have adopted a condemnation test by implica-
tion, however. See infra Part II.
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The McConnell Court did not find that a "vast majority" of the issue
ads considered were the functional equivalent of direct advocacy. Ra-
ther, it found that such ads had an "electioneering purpose." For the
reasons we have explained, "purpose" is not the appropriate test for
distinguishing between genuine issue ads and the functional equiva-
lent of express advocacy. 165
Thus, the principal opinion, unlike Justice Scalia's concur-
rence, 166 chose to ignore the political reality that under the
principal opinion's no-reasonable-interpretation test, corpora-
tions and unions will be able to run ads likely to affect (and of-
ten with the purpose of affecting) federal elections. The prin-
cipal opinion also expressly tells courts to ignore valuable
context in interpreting the likely effect of an advertisement. 167
This is in contrast to McConnell's statement that "Congress is
not required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular
practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context."1 68
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both sophisticated
judges who obviously gave the crafting of the principal opinion
a great deal of thought, likely did not naively believe the no-
reasonable-interpretation test would effectively separate elec-
tion-related advertising from issue-related advertising uncon-
nected to elections. 69 To the contrary, they acknowledged the
165. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2670 n.8. The principal opinion added its view
that the "vast majority language" was dicta and not binding on the Court. See
id.
166. Justice Scalia had no problem discerning the purpose of the ad:
The purpose of the ad was to put political pressure upon Senator
Feingold to change his position on the filibuster-not only through
the constituents who accepted the invitation to contact him, but also
through the very existence of an ad bringing to the public's attention
that he, Senator Feingold, stood athwart the allowance of a vote on
judicial nominees. (Unlike the principal opinion, I think that is the
fair import of the ad in context).
Id. at 2684 n.8 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. See id. at 2669 n.7 (principal opinion).
168. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).
169. The most disingenuous passage in the principal opinion concerns a
piece of legislation that the House of Representatives was considering during
the electioneering communications window. "There would be no reason to re-
gard an ad supporting or opposing that Act, and urging citizens to contact
their Representatives about it, as the equivalent of an ad saying vote for or
against the Representative." WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2667. The history of pre-
BCRA advertising just before an election makes clear that most of such adver-
tising mentioning a federal candidate had an electoral purpose, a point which
a majority of the Court appears to accept. See id. at 2670 n.8 (noting that the
Court in McConnell accepted the idea that the "vast majority" of such ads had
an electioneering purpose); see also id. at 2684 n.8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (not-
ing the purpose of WRTL's advertisement).
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line may now be impossible to draw. 170 They likely predicted
that their test would lead to the end of effective limits on corpo-
rate and union election-related spending from general treasu-
ries. That result appears well in line with the First Amendment
deregulatory tone of the opinion.
If that is the case, it at first appears to be a jurisprudential
mystery why the two newest Justices did not simply sign on to
Justice Scalia's opinion, which would have overturned McCon-
nell and Austin on this point.17 1 The answer to the mystery is
political, not jurisprudential. Having promised moderation and
incrementalism during his confirmation hearings,172 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts apparently did not want to pay a political cost for
appearing to move too quickly to overturn precedent. 173 But re-
gardless of appearances, the opinion cannot be reconciled with
the McConnell case decided just a few years before.
2. The Abandonment of Austin and Beaumont and the
Misinterpretation of Bellotti
The principal opinion in WRTL II not only turns McCon-
nell's section 203 holding on its head; it also undermines the
Court's earlier treatment of corporate spending in candidate
elections from Austin174 and Beaumont.1 75 Further, it calls into
question the continued constitutionality of a PAC requirement
for corporate (and union) general treasury spending on adver-
tisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candi-
dates for federal office. 176
In Buckley,177 the Court did not reach the question whether
election-related spending limits, unconstitutional as applied to
170. See id. at 2669 (principal opinion) ("At best, appellants have shown
what we have acknowledged at least since Buckley: that 'the distinction be.
tween discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
candidates may often dissolve in practical application.' . . .Discussion of issues
cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent to an
election.").
171. See id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
173. This is a pattern that marked the Court's 2006 Term aside from the
campaign finance cases. Vikram David Amar, The Supreme Court's Problemat-
ic Use of Precedent over the Past Term: Why Overruling or Refashioning May,
in Some Cases, Be Better Than Selective Interpretation, FINDLAW, July 20,
2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20070720.html.
174. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
175. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
176. See, e.g., id. at 156.
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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individuals, could still be constitutional as applied to corpora-
tions. In Bellotti, the Court took the strongest position (until
WRTL 11) in favor of corporate First Amendment rights in the
context of noncandidate ballot measure elections. 178 But the
Court there was careful in Bellotti to drop a footnote refusing to
undermine federal and state law limiting corporations from
spending general treasury funds in candidate elections. 179
In Austin, the Court directly held that corporations could
be limited to using PAC funds to pay for express advocacy in
candidate elections based upon the "distortion" that corporate
spending can cause to the electoral process.18 0 In McConnell,
the Court extended Austin to unions1 81 (without explaining how
the "distortion" rationale might apply to labor union mem-
bers)18 2 and to nonexpress advocacy in the form of corporate
and union electioneering communications.18 3 In addition, just
before McConnell, the Court in Beaumont upheld a ban on
MCFL-type corporations' campaign contributions to election
campaigns, in language that sharply denigrated the value of
corporate First Amendment rights.18 4
Without directly overruling Austin or Beaumont, the
WRTL 11 principal opinion seriously undermined them by re-
peatedly trumpeting the value of corporate free speech rights
and descrying what the opinion termed "censorship."18 5 The
principal opinion then tried to shove the WRTL case-about a
candidate election-into the rules from Bellotti governing ballot
measure elections.18 6 First, the principal opinion concluded
(quite correctly and obviously) that the WRTL advertisements
did not include express advocacy.' 8 7 Then, after adopting a
quite stingy definition of the "functional equivalent" of express
advocacy, 8 8 the principal opinion determined that WRTL's ad-
178. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
179. Id. at 788 n.26.
180. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
181. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003).
182. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 56-57 (criticizing the McConnell Court for
failing to explain how the Austin rationale applied to unions).
183. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-06.
184. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 (2003).
185. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL H), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2671
n.9, 2674 (2007); see also supra text accompanying note 146 (quoting the
Court's rejection of the idea that the PAC alternative was sufficiently speech-
protective of the rights of corporations and unions).
186. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2671-73.
187. See id. at 2667.
188. See id.
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vertisements were not the functional equivalent of such advo-
cacy.18 9 That left the ads looking like "issues ads,"190 which the
Court saw as closely related to the ballot measure election ad-
vertising that the Court in Bellotti held could be paid for with
corporate funds. 191 This conflation ignored the fact that the
WRTL ads were in fact likely to affect voter choices in the out-
come of elections.1 92 Therefore the ads fairly fell into the cate-
gory of candidate election speech that Congress sought to regu-
late in section 203 of the BCRA.193
To bolster the analogy to Bellotti, the principal opinion
misstated Bellotti's holding. It claimed that the Bellotti Court
had rejected the proposition "that the PAC option would justify
regulation of all corporate speech."'194 However, the Massachu-
setts corporation considered in Bellotti did not have an option
to try to influence the outcome of the ballot measure election
using a PAC, and the Bellotti Court never addressed the issue,
contrary to WRTL 11's intimation.
In the end, the WRTL II principal opinion does something I
thought impossible. It took the already irreconcilable and inco-
herent distinction between the treatment of corporate election
spending in candidate- and ballot-measure elections set forth in
Bellotti and Austin and confused the issue even more. The clear
import of the principal opinion is that any limits on corporate
and union spending in elections-candidate or ballot meas-
ure-violate the First Amendment. But the Court refused to
take the final step of applying its reasoning to Austin and
McConnell. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the Justices
should have done so.
3. Ignoring Randall's Competitiveness Test
The third inconsistency within WRTL 11 involves the
Court's 2006 opinion, Randall v. Sorrell, which struck down
Vermont's campaign finance contribution limits as too low.' 95
In that case, Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito, wrote the controlling opinion.196
189. See id. at 2670.
190. Id. at 2672.
191. Id. at 2671-72.
192. See id. at 2660-61 (describing WRTL's ads).
193. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. V 2007).
194. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2671 n.9.
195. 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (2006).
196. See id. at 2485.
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The opinion held that the Vermont limits were too low because
they prevented challengers from mounting effective cam-
paigns. 197
"Competitiveness" has proven to be a one-trick pony. The
WRTL II principal opinion did not cite to Randall, nor do the
words "competition" or "competitiveness" appear in the princip-
al opinion. Though the principal opinion discussed the purpose
of the First Amendment as promoting robust debate, 198 no-
where did the Court determine how broadly or narrowly to craft
an as-applied exemption based upon how it was likely to affect
the competitiveness of campaigns. The principal opinion did not
explain how competition, an issue that was decisive in the
campaign contribution context just a year before, now became
utterly irrelevant.
4. Inconsistent Treatment of Effects Tests
In crafting the as-applied test, the principal opinion in
WRTL II purported to reject any test that would separate elec-
tion ads from "genuine issue ads" based upon either the intent
of the speaker or the likely effect of the advertisement on an
election.199 The Court said that such a test would be impermiss-
ible because it would put the speaker at the mercy of the varied
understanding of the hearers and would lead to burdensome
and expert-driven litigation.200
The principal opinion's test, however, is also an effects test.
In determining whether an "ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate," 201 a court (or an administrative body such
as the FEC) needs to ask what a hearer would believe to be a
reasonable interpretation of the advertisement. Consider the
hypothetical advertisement posed above: "Jane Doe wants to be
your president, but Jane Doe's position on global warming is
evil. Don't let her ruin the world." A court cannot determine
whether the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a candidate with-
out considering how hearers would react to the advertisement.
The court would need to ask: is it reasonable (for someone?) to
view this ad as something beside an appeal to vote for or
197. See id. at 2492, 2500.
198. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2665.
199. See id. at 2665-66.
200. Id. at 2666.
201. Id. at 2667.
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against a candidate, such as an ad on the "issue" of "global
warming" and Doe's position on it?
The principal opinion's test shifts the burden 202 and gives
the "tie" to corporations who wish to engage in election-related
spending. 203 Under this test, few advertisements will in fact fall
into the category of "no reasonable interpretation" 204 as any-
thing other than an appeal for or against a candidate. It is
therefore less burdensome than some other effects tests. 20 5 But
that does not take away from the key point that in making the
determination of whether an advertisement is subject to an ex-
emption, a decision maker is going to have to consider the effect
of the advertisement on the electorate. 206
In all, the principal opinion cannot be read as either con-
sistent with recent precedent or even internally inconsistent in
its treatment of electoral effects. This is not to say that the
principal opinion's result was incorrect-this is a question
about which reasonable people will disagree. But, rather than
try to craft a more politically palatable opinion, the Chief Jus-
tice and Justice Alito should have been honest and simply
joined Justice Scalia's forthright embrace of deregulation. 207
Coherence has virtues the principal opinion ignores.
202. Id. at 2663-64 (describing the applicable standards of review and re-
quired demonstrations of proof).
203. See id. at 2669 ('"Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie
goes to the speaker, not the censor.").
204. See id. at 2667 (describing the no-reasonable-interpretation test).
205. In the amicus brief I coauthored with Professor Briffault, we proposed
the following specific effects test: "[T]hat a corporation should be entitled to an
as-applied exemption from the PAC requirement for electioneering communi-
cations only when it proves that an identifiable type of communication is un-
likely to have any appreciable effect on voters' choices in the election." Brief
Amici Curiae, supra note t, at 4. Like the principal opinion, we found an in-
tent test unworkable. Id. For Professor Briffault's views of the WRTL II case,
see generally Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign
Finance's Long and Winding Road, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 101 (2008).
206. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing
the principal opinion's test and other tests as one "tied to the public percep-
tion, or a court's perception, of the import, the intent, or the effect of the ad").
207. For a forceful argument to the contrary, see Edward B. Foley,
Precedent and Judicial Responsibility, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, July 3, 2007,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=161. For
another charitable view of the principal opinion, see Allison R. Hayward, Poli-
tics as Usual: The Latest Supreme Court Ruling Won't Bring a Sea Change in
Campaign Finance, LEGAL TIMES, July 9, 2007, at 50 ("On the other hand, Ro-
berts' Wisconsin Right to Life decision fits the profile of many of the Court's
other decisions. He joins a line of justices who have attempted to craft a mid-
dle way. For this, Justice Antonin Scalia's feisty concurrence calling for a
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II. THE PRACTICAL EVISCERATION OF THE CORPORATE
AND UNION PAC REQUIREMENT
In this Part, I turn away from theory and toward the prac-
tical implementation of the WRTL 11 principal opinion's test for
separating the functional equivalent of express advocacy (which
may be subject to the corporate and union PAC requirement of
section 203 of the BCRA) and genuine issue advocacy (which
may be paid for directly out of corporate and union general
treasury funds). I conclude that the principal opinion's test will
effectively eviscerate the corporate and union PAC requirement
for election-related advertising, even though there will remain
a number of difficult line-drawing questions to bother academ-
ics (and judges, to the extent that BCRA opponents bring more
test cases to push Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to
embrace campaign finance deregulation more directly).
Consider again the language of the test that the principal
opinion sets out to separate the functional equivalent of express
advocacy from genuine issue advocacy: "[A] court should find
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only
if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."208
And in making that determination, the Court emphasized that
(1) there can be no free-ranging intent-and-effect test; (2) there gen-
erally should be no discovery or inquiry into the sort of "contextual"
factors highlighted by the FEC and the intervenors; (3) discussion of
issues cannot be banned merely because the issues might be relevant
to an election; and (4) in a debatable case, the tie is resolved in favor
of protecting speech.209
Further, the burden is on the government to prove the adver-
tisement is not subject to an exemption, 210 and in close cases,
"the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor."211
Though it is not difficult to imagine hypothetical ads that
would fail the principal opinion's no-reasonable-interpretation
test ("Jane Doe wants to be your president, but Jane Doe is an
evil person. Don't let her ruin the world."), such ad hominem
attacks are a rarity and likely ineffective as a matter of cam-
wholesale rejection of the BCRA and Souter's dissent insisting on deference to
Congress both give him grief.").
208. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
209. Id. at 2669 n.7.
210. Id. at 2663-64.
211. Id. at 2669; id. at 2674 ("[W]hen it comes to defining what speech
qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy subject to such a
ban[,] ... we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.").
1096 [92:1064
BEYOND INCOHERENCE
paign policy. The kinds of ads we are now likely to see funded
by corporate and union treasuries, in contrast, should fall with-
in WRTL II's safe harbor.
Here is what we know about federal campaign advertising
before the BCRA. Very few ads broadcast close to an election
that feature candidates for office contain express advocacy, 212
and those that don't almost always mention a legislative issue,
even if they are also attacking a candidate. 213 Indeed, in the
2000 Buying Time study, the coders found that over 92.2% of
electioneering ads were either solely policy-focused or focused
on a combination of policy the personal traits of candidates.2 14
Only 7.1% of ads were wholly focused on the personal. 215
These findings should not be surprising. Viewers or listen-
ers want to know why Doe should be considered evil and likely
respond poorly to ad hominem attacks. Campaign consultants
can tell them why they should not support Doe by simply tying
Doe to, as the WRTL II principal opinion put it, "a legislative
issue that is either currently the subject of legislative scrutiny
or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near fu-
ture."216 Note the breadth of this standard. What issue is un-
likely to become the subject of legislative scrutiny by some
member of Congress in the near future? In 2006, for example,
there were 3738 bills introduced into Congress, 217 and of course
many more potential bills that could have been introduced on
topics ranging from taxes to Iraq to national defense to pu-
212. "It is undisputed that very few ads-whether run by candidates, par-
ties, or interest groups-used words of express advocacy." McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 127 n.18. The McConnell Court added that "[i]n the 1998 election
cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisements used magic words; in 2000, that
number was a mere 5%." Id.
213. See id. at 126-27 (discussing ads that condemn candidates on specific
issues).
214. HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 88, at 32 fig.4.9. Though the
principal opinion was quite critical of the Buying Time studies, it was not on
the coding of thiz particular issue. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2665 n.4 (dis-
cussing the use of the study in McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 307-
12, 585-88 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). Nor
is there any reason to think that Justices Roberts or Alito would reject the
point that most electioneering communications advertisements run before the
BCRA mentioned issues that were the subject, or could soon be the subject, of
legislative scrutiny.
215. HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 88, at 32 fig.4.9.
216. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2669 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC,
466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 207 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)).
217. 152 CONG. REC. D1170, D1173 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2006) (listing data
on legislative activity in 2006).
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nishment for sex offenders. As the Court noted in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,218 reviewing a law barring a judi-
cial candidate from "announcing" his or her position on issues
likely to come before the courts, "there is almost no legal or po-
litical issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an Ameri-
can court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction."219 The same
is true of issues that could be considered by legislators.
Thus, most ads that have a purpose to affect, or are likely
to affect federal elections will comfortably fall on the permitted
side of the line created by the WRTL 11 principal opinion. Simp-
ly put, for most ads there will be a reasonable interpretation of
even an ad likely to affect the outcome of a federal election that
it is something other than an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate.
There is of course room for argument along the edges. How
"likely" does it have to be that an issue would be the subject of
legislative scrutiny to count under the new test? How much
"scrutiny" or potential scrutiny does there have to be by a legis-
lator to count? The principal opinion does not say. But ads on
health care, taxes, the environment, education, or Iraq surely
are subject to "legislative scrutiny" and will likely to be "issues"
discussed in ads run before the 2008 election.
The biggest unanswered question the principal opinion
raises is whether condemnation of a candidate for office would
take an ad outside the no-reasonable-interpretation test.220 The
test itself does not mention condemnation of a candidate as di-
rectly relevant, so it is quite probable that a court would con-
clude that an ad that calls Jane Doe's position on global warm-
ing "evil" could still be considered a genuine issue ad not
constitutionally regulated under section 203. One "reasonable
interpretation" of the ad (though perhaps not the best interpre-
tation of the ad if we were allowed-though we are not-to view
it in the context of the campaign) is that it is about the issue of
global warming.
But in an important footnote, the principal opinion may
have muddied the waters. It suggested that an advertisement
is subject to no reasonable interpretation as anything other
than an appeal to support or oppose a candidate if it contains
218. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
219. Id. at 772 (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,
229 (7th Cir. 1993)).
220. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2698-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the principal opinion's treatment of condemnation ads).
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language of condemnation. The principal opinion sought to dis-
tinguish WRTL's ads from a hypothetical Jane Doe ad men-
tioned in McConnell, condemning Jane Doe's position on an is-
sue and urging voters to call Doe to tell her what they think
about her position:
But [the Jane Doe] ad "condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular
issue." WRTL's ads do not do so; they instead take a position on the fi-
libuster issue and exhort constituents to contact Senators Feingold
and Kohl to advance that position. Indeed, one would not even know
from the ads whether Senator Feingold supported or opposed filibus-
ters.2
21
The footnote builds upon the principal opinion's statement
that WRTL's ads are not like express advocacy because they
"focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort
the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact
public officials with respect to the matter."222 Further, they "do
not mention an election candidacy, political party, or challen-
ger; and they do not take a position on a candidate's character,
qualifications, or fitness for office." 22 3
There is certainly room for debate on the question of how to
treat condemnatory ads under the WRTL II principal opinion
test. The other seven Justices on the Court believed a condem-
natory Jane Doe ad would now be exempt under the no-
reasonable-interpretation test.224 Indeed, as Justice Scalia re-
marked in his concurrence, the principal opinion's test "at least
arguably protects the most 'striking' example of a so-called
sham issue ad in the McConnell record, the notorious 'Yellow-
tail ad,' which accused Bill Yellowtail of striking his wife and
then urged listeners to call him and '[tiell him to support family
values."'225 It is not clear whether lower courts and the FEC
should follow what the controlling opinion says the test means,
or what a contrary majority of the Court says it means-there
221. Id. at 2667 n.6 (principal opinion) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2003)).
222. Id. at 2667.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("While its coverage is not en-
tirely clear, [the principal opinion's test] would apparently protect even
McConnell's paradigmatic example of the functional equivalent of express ad-
vocacy-the so-called 'Jane Doe ad."'); id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If it
is now unconstitutional to restrict WRTL's Feingold ads, then it follows that
[section] 203 can no longer be applied constitutionally to McConnell's Jane Doe
paradigm.").
225. Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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are self-serving reasons for each set of Justices to exaggerate or
minimize the significance of the principal opinion's holding. 226
But these debates are of interest mostly to academics and
to those litigants who might want to push the Court further. As
far as practicalities, it will be easy to avoid express words of
condemnation (as well as explicit mentions of the candidate's
candidacy, character, and fitness for office) while still crafting
an effective ad. Consider: "As a member of Congress, Jane Doe
voted seven times against a treaty that would have stopped
global warming. Call Jane Doe and tell her you think her posi-
tion on global warming is just plain wrong." As with the old "is-
sue advocacy," it will be "child's play for campaign professionals
to develop ads that effectively advocate or oppose the cause of a
226. Just before the 2008 primary season, the FEC issued a set of guide-
lines creating a WRTL exemption from the requirement that corporations and
unions pay for electioneering communications from separate PAC funds. See
Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,913-15 (Dec. 26,
2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104, 114). Before it was promulgated,
there was a great deal of debate within and outside the FEC over the contours
of the final rule. See Susan Crabtree, FEC Decision Could Launch Attack Ads,
Watchdogs Warn, HILL, Nov. 20, 2007, at 1.
In essence, the FEC rule works as follows: if an advertisement that oth-
erwise qualifies as an electioneering communication avoids mentioning "any
election, candidacy, political party, opposing candidate, or voting by the gener-
al public," and it does not "take a position on any candidate's or officeholder's
character, qualifications or fitness for office," but it focuses on a legislative,
executive, or judicial matter or issue and "[u]rges a candidate to take a partic-
ular position or action with respect to the matter or issue," or "urges the public
to adopt a particular position and to contact the candidate with respect to the
matter or issue," the ad falls in the safe harbor and may be paid for with cor-
porate or treasury funds. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at
72,914 (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 114.15). A separate exception applies for
advertising that proposes a commercial transaction. Id. If the communication
does not fall in the safe harbor, for example, an electioneering communication
that mentions an election or a candidate's fitness for office, then the Commis-
sion
will consider whether the communication includes any indicia of ex-
press advocacy and whether the communication has an interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Fed-
eral candidate in order to determine whether, on balance, the com-
munication is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than
as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Federal candi-
date.
Id. It remains to be seen how the FEC will in fact rule on communications out-
side of the safe harbor. But the safe harbor itself, consistent with the principal
opinion in WRTL II, allows a great deal of the kinds of sham issue advocacy
that existed before the passage of the BCRA. See Posting of Rick Hasen to
Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/009764.html (Nov. 20,
2007, 12:57 EST).
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candidate but fall short of" failing the principal opinion's new
test.
2 2 7
What will the new test mean for corporate and union
spending in future elections? While the picture is not entirely
clear, we should see a rise in corporate spending on both the
federal level and on the state and local level in those jurisdic-
tions that impose similar limits to the federal limits. Union
spending may not rise as much, because unions did not cut
back much on their spending under the BCRA.
Corporate spending from general treasury funds on federal
elections fell fairly considerably after the BCRA. Title I of the
BCRA (not at issue in WRTL II) barred corporations, unions,
and others from giving large donations to political parties (so-
called soft money) for the parties to pay for issue advertise-
ments and other related activities. 228 Of corporations giving
more than $100,000 in soft money in both 2000 and 2002, the
amount of spending from corporate treasury funds fell from
$113.2 million (in soft money) in 2000 to $6.1 million (given to
527 organizations) 229 in 2004.230 Even without WRTL II, I
would have expected corporate spending to rise in the 2008
election, as some of the uncertainty surrounding donations to
527 organizations gets resolved 231 and given the expected com-
petitiveness of both the presidential and congressional contests.
It is not clear that the amounts would have reached pre-BCRA
227. First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of Richard Briffault, Professor, Columbia Law
School).
228. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143-44 (2003) (describing the soft
money provisions in Title I of the BCRA).
229. So-called 527 organizations are nonparty organizations that arose af-
ter the BCRA to engage in spending intended to influence the outcome of fed-
eral elections but not subject to either the soft money rules or the $5000 indi-
vidual contribution limits applicable to political committees. See Briffault,
supra note 21, at 949-55. Litigation related to the constitutionality (and per-
missibility under FECA) of regulating 527 organizations arose in connection
with the 2004 election and continues today. See id. See generally Stephen R.
Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION AF-
TER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
79 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006) [hereinafter ELECTION AFTER REFORM).
230. Robert G. Boatright et al., Interest Groups and Advocacy Organiza-
tions After BCRA, in ELECTION AFTER REFORM, supra note 229, at 112, 118.
231. See Allan J. Cigler, Interest Groups and Financing the 2004 Elections,
in FINANCING THE 2004 ELECTION 208, 228 (David B. Magleby et al. eds.,
2006) ("A series of corporate scandals had made many businesses uneasy
about contributing disclosed funds to 527s without FEC approval. Moreover,
businesses are generally wary of funding new groups.").
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levels, as some soft money was likely given by corporations to
curry favor with elected officials who demanded the dona-
tions. 232 But WRTL 11 creates an opening for corporations to
give much larger sums for issue ads in the 2008 campaign-
particularly if they can more easily disguise their identities be-
hind trade groups or groups with generic and innocuous
names.
2 33
Corporations have not been shy in the past to get involved
in congressional and other races where they have strong insti-
tutional interests in the results. 234 With the possibility of a
Democratic Congress and a Democratic president in 2008, I ex-
pect some serious corporate money to now appear on the table.
We already have seen considerable corporate spending on judi-
cial elections where corporate interests are at stake. In those
states with state supreme courts considering tort reform, busi-
ness involvement in elections has been substantial. For exam-
ple, "[i]n 2004, all of the group spending on television advertis-
ing in Alabama [state judicial election contests] came from pro-
business groups intent on protecting sitting Republican justices
perceived to be business-friendly." 235
It is less clear that WRTL I will cause a rise in labor union
spending on elections, at least on the federal level. This is not
because unions are less interested than corporations in elec-
tion-related spending; it is because "most of the[] dollars" that
unions had directed to party soft money before the BCRA "ap-
pear to have been spent elsewhere, either directly or in the
form of contributions to Democratic-leaning 527s."236
232. See Boatright et al., supra note 230, at 120 ("Many large corporations
give contributions not so much to affect election outcomes as to develop and
maintain a relationship with an officeholder.... When large corporations used
institutional (corporate treasury) money to give soft money, they typically
were responding to requests from officeholders, party officials, or their
agents.").
233. See id. at 125.
234. See David B. Magleby, The Importance of Outside Money in the 2002
Congressional Elections, in THE LAST HURRAH? SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE AD-
VOCACY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1, 14 (David B. Magleby & J.
Quin Monson eds., 2004) ("Corporate and treasury funds have been a compo-
nent of party soft-money receipts and a major source of electioneering issue
advocacy since 1996.").
235. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 82 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
236. Thomas E. Mann, Lessons for Reformers, in FINANCING THE 2004
ELECTION, supra note 231, at 241, 249.
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In sum, the WRTL II principal opinion's test separating the
functional equivalent of express advocacy, which must be paid
for by corporate or union PAC funds, from genuine issue advo-
cacy, which may be paid for from corporate or union treasury
funds, provides a broad safe harbor for corporations and un-
ions. It allows them to spend large sums seeking to influence
the outcome of elections. Though there are line-drawing prob-
lems that may vex academics and courts, corporations and un-
ions can safely stay within the limits of the law and still run
ads likely to affect and intended to affect the outcome of elec-
tions. We should expect to see much more corporate-funded
election advertising in future elections.
III. THE FUTURE DEREGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
The final Part of this Article turns to the future, and looks
at various additional campaign finance laws that may be chal-
lenged under the authority of the WRTL II principal opinion.
To be sure, this effort to predict the future is difficult because
much depends upon the personnel of the Court as the Justices
confront new campaign finance cases. For example, while the
Court was in its New Deference mode, I thought a very credible
argument could be made to impose additional campaign finance
limitations on ballot measure elections. 237 But Justice
O'Connor's replacement by Justice Alito has changed the va-
lence of the Court on campaign finance issues, and predictions I
made in 2004 and 2005 based upon the prior Justices' positions
no longer hold in 2007 or 2008.
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the Court will
continue to side with campaign finance deregulation over the
next decade. Although currently there is a conservative-liberal
split on the current Supreme Court on this issue (with the more
liberal members of the Court more willing to uphold campaign
finance regulation), that split does not appear consistently to
explain positions beyond the Court. Consider, for example, for-
mer Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan, who many
observers believe could be on any Democratic president's short
list for the Supreme Court.238 Sullivan is certainly a liberal, but
237. See Hasen, supra note 3, passim.
238. See Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog
.com/movabletype/archives/2007/07/thedemocratic.html (July 12, 2007, 11:12
EST) (listing potential Democratic Supreme Court nominees).
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she has been outspokenly hostile to campaign finance regula-
tion.239
More immediately, if the current members of the Supreme
Court remain on the Court, what would that mean for chal-
lenges to other campaign finance regulations? Randall and
WRTL I1 make clear that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ali-
to form the controlling bloc on campaign finance questions, and
they have sent strong signals through the tone of their opinions
that they are both very skeptical of campaign finance regula-
tion challenged under the First Amendment. They are quite
willing to entertain challenges to existing campaign finance
precedents in future cases. It is worth recalling that Justice
Alito separately concurred in both Randall and WRTL II to in-
vite litigants to bring facial challenges to Buckley's contribution
limits and to McConnell's upholding section 203 of the BCRA
against a facial challenge. 240
Though the Roberts Court's faux minimalist approach in
WRTL I1 allows for some variation in how lower courts will ad-
dress campaign finance challenges in the near term, the lower
courts' pre-McConnell experience demonstrates that many low-
er courts are likely to strike down ever more campaign finance
regulations on First Amendment grounds.24 1 Before McConnell,
for example, the Fourth Circuit held that an advertisement
broadcast before the 1996 presidential election that focused on
Bill Clinton's so-called homosexual agenda was an ad about the
issue of homosexuality, and not an ad meant to attack Bill
Clinton.242 Those few appellate courts that take a more defe-
239. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 664 (1997) ("[T]he much belittled constitu-
tional case against campaign finance limits is surprisingly strong, and.., the
better way to resolve the anomalies created by Buckley v. Valeo may well be
not to impose new expenditure limits on political campaigns, but rather to
eliminate contribution limits.").
240. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL H), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007)
(Alito, J., concurring); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (2006) (Alito,
J., concurring).
241. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 922 n.8 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that, as of 2001, with the
exception of one case, "lower courts have been uniformly hostile to attempts to
regulate issue advocacy consistent with the First Amendment"); see also id. at
923-24 (discussing lower court cases before the Supreme Court's opinion in
Shrink Missouri striking down campaign contribution limits as unconstitu-
tionally low).
242. FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1058 (4th Cir.
1997) ("The text of the television advertisement is nonprescriptive, taking no
position whatever.., on the candidacy of Governor Clinton ... ").
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rential approach to campaign finance laws, such as the Second
Circuit in Randall,243 likely will face Supreme Court reversal.
Attorneys such as Jim Bopp are likely to bring additional
challenges to both the BCRA and other campaign finance
laws. 244 I expect to see challenges to laws upheld by the Su-
preme Court in the past, such as the ban on corporate and un-
ion spending from treasury on express advocacy. 245 I also ex-
pect to see challenges to laws that the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed, such as a challenge to the constitutionality
of contribution limits to independent expenditure committees
and 527 organizations. 246
I expect most of these challenges would succeed before the
currently constituted Roberts Court. On the corporate/union
PAC requirement for express advocacy, it is not a large step at
all from the principal opinion in WRTL II to a holding overrul-
ing Austin and McConnell on this point. The Court could simply
quote those parts of the WRTL II opinion extolling the First
Amendment virtues of free speech, and criticizing the ban that
criminalizes corporate free speech in candidate elections-an
opinion reaching the conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito resisted acknowledging in WRTL II. Over time,
these Justices will probably be less sensitive to a need to ap-
pear to be taking minimalist or incremental steps away from
existing precedent.
Nor would it be much of a stretch, once the Court has over-
turned McConnell's holding on issue advocacy, for the Court to
overturn McConnell's soft-money holding. The Court could rec-
ognize the "rights" of wealthy individuals, corporations and un-
243. Landall v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 97 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom.
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) ("Just as the McConnell Court de-
ferred to Congress'[s] 'predictive judgments' about the need for federal regula-
tion of soft-money contributions, we respect the Vermont Legislature's similar
reliance-in enacting regulations on both campaign contributions and expend-
itures--on its substantial historical experience with campaign finance reform
and its informed predictions about Vermont candidate and donor behavior."
(citation omitted)).
244. See Posting of Rick Hasen to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog
.org/archives/008914.html (July 19, 2007, 10:25 EST) (quoting WRTL's attor-
ney Jim Bopp as commenting that if the FEC does not craft a broad rule im-
plementing the Supreme Court's WRTL II decision, "expect the Court to se-
riously consider striking the whole 'electioneering communication' prohibition
and I bet that they will get that opportunity").
245. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000); see also supra notes 18-20 and accompany-
ing text.
246. See generally Briffault, supra note 21, at 970-90.
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ions to fund genuine issue ads through six- and seven-figure
donations to political parties. After all, if corporations could
spend directly on such ads, shouldn't the First Amendment al-
low for such spending by proxy? This kind of argument could be
bolstered by an appeal to the special role of political parties in
fostering elections and democracy, a role the Court acknowl-
edged after McConnell in Randall.247
Once the Court has taken this step, it could then turn to
reconsider the constitutionality of any contribution limits, per-
haps in a challenge to the current federal individual contribu-
tion limits or to another state law. One form of challenge would
be to argue that even at these amounts it is impossible for chal-
lengers to mount effective campaigns. 248 Another argument
would be the one that Justice Thomas has advanced, that cam-
paign contribution laws should be subject to strict scrutiny and
fail such scrutiny because contribution limits of even a few
thousand dollars are not narrowly tailored to prevent corrup-
tion.2 49
It is less clear how the two newest Justices, as well as Jus-
tice Kennedy, 250 would react to such an argument, but it would
not be too surprising, given WRTL II, for them to be swayed by
it. The anticorruption/appearance of corruption rationale has
carried too much weight in recent years in the New Deference
cases, and a reaction in the other direction denying any force at
all to the argument would have some appeal to those who re-
coiled at the New Deference.
Even if the Court were not willing (or not yet willing) to
completely jettison the anticorruption argument for campaign
contributions to candidates, the Court could rule that contribu-
tions to independent expenditure committees may not be con-
stitutionally limited to $5000, as current law requires. A Court
majority may reason that if an individual has a First Amend-
ment right to make unlimited expenditures supporting or op-
posing a candidate for office so long as that spending is inde-
247. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (recognizing that low contribution lim-
its "threaten[] harm to a particularly important political right, the right to as-
sociate in a political party").
248. See id. ("[T]he critical question concerns ... the ability of a candidate
running against an incumbent officeholder to mount an effective challenge.").
249. See id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would overrule Buckley
and subject both ... contribution and expenditure limits ... to strict scrutiny,
which they would fail.").
250. See supra note 150 (detailing Justice Kennedy's evolving approach to
campaign finance statutes).
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pendent, arguably individuals have a First Amendment right to
band together to accomplish the same purpose. The indepen-
dence in both circumstances supposedly prevents the corrup-
tion of candidates for office.
Finally, it is possible that the Roberts Court might enter-
tain a challenge to laws requiring the disclosure of ads likely to
influence the outcome of elections. Section 203 of the BCRA re-
quires corporations and unions to use PACs to fund electioneer-
ing communications. 251 Furthermore, section 201 of the law al-
so requires anyone, including individuals who spent more than
$10,000 on electioneering communications, to file reports of
contributions and expenditures with the FEC.252
In the WRTL case, the plaintiff did not challenge section
201, and agreed to file the requisite disclosure reports with the
FEC and include disclaimers on its advertising.253 But Jim
Bopp, the lawyer who represented WRTL, has argued before
the FEC for the extension of the as-applied exemption to the
BCRA's disclosure provisions as part of the FEC's rulemaking
procedure to craft regulations implementing the WRTL deci-
sion.254
This argument will be considerably harder to make to the
current Court. In McConnell, the Justices voted 8-1 to uphold
section 201 of the BCRA against an argument that compelled
disclosure violated the First Amendment.25 5 Only Justice Tho-
251. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(1) (Supp. V 2007).
252. See id. § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1).
253. See Brief of Appellee at 10, FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II),
127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (Nos. 06-969, 06-970) ("WRTL challenged the prohibi-
tion, not disclosure, and was prepared to provide the full disclosure required
under BCRA."); see also id. at 10 n.18 ("Full disclosure of WRTL's identity and
activities as required by law would have been forthcoming. WRTL's ads con-
tained the disclaimers required by 11 C.F.R. § 110.11.," (citation omitted)).
254. See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Gen. Counsel,
James Madison Ctr. for Free Speech, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rule-
making 2007-16 (Electioneering Communications) (Oct. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.org/FinancefMadisonCenterCommentsReWR
-TLII.pdf. Professor Briffault and I filed a letter with the FEC urging it not to
extend the as-applied exemption to the BCRA's disclosure provisions. See Post-
ing of Rick Hasen to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/
009393.html (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:46 EST).
255. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (upholding section 201
of the BCRA); id. at 321 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court
that section 201-except for the advance disclosure requirement-was consti-
tutional).
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mas was swayed by that argument.256 This means that even if
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with Justice
Thomas about campaign finance anonymity (a point not at all
evident from their views in Randall and WRTL II), Justices
Scalia and Kennedy might not agree. Justice Scalia dissented
in McIntrye v. Ohio Elections Commission, the main case re-
cognizing a right to fund campaign ads anonymously at least in
limited circumstances. 257
This leaves us with a Court that is likely to move heavily
toward deregulation, but likely not as far as the pole position
on deregulation (rejecting even campaign finance disclosure)
occupied by Justice Thomas. But for those who are looking to
the Court to move in Justice Thomas's direction, there are a
number of "pretty darn good"258 days likely ahead.
CONCLUSION
"Enough is enough" is more than just a line from the
WRTL 11 principal opinion rejecting an argument apparently
that was not advanced by the government or intervenors in the
case. It is the new rallying cry of the campaign finance deregu-
lationists, who were deflated and dejected after McConnell,259
but who now will be emboldened by the decision in WRTL II. It
is the tease from the pivotal Justices that more is yet to come.
The WRTL 11 principal opinion is artful, both in the sense
of showing great skill and in its (at least mild) disingenuous-
ness. It is also somewhat schizophrenic, containing all the First
Amendment deregulatory bombast of a campaign finance opi-
nion by Justice Scalia or Thomas but without the expected fol-
low-through declaring core campaign finance regulation un-
256. See id. at 275 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I must now address an issue
on which I differ from all of my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in BCRA
section 201 ....").
257. See 514 U.S. 334, 371, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the
majority's opinion "a distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening of the
future"); see also id. at 357 (majority opinion).
258. See Posting of Brad Smith to Redstate, http://www.redstate.com/blogsl
sections/specialfeatures/fec (June 25, 2007, 11:37 EST) ("Monday's Supreme
Court decision.., is cause for a little celebration. It's not a great day for Free
Speech, but it's a pretty darn good one.").
259. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's
First Amendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 127 (2004) ("One who finds herself, as
I do, largely dismayed by Justices Stevens' and O'Connor's majority opinion
and persuaded by the dissenters' views embarks on the task of commenting on
the decision in McConnell v. FEC with considerable trepidation. One has, after
all, been quite thoroughly vanquished." (footnote omitted)).
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constitutional and irreparably so. Its ultimate message, howev-
er, is not one rejecting the deregulatory position but rather that
of "sit tight." Good things come to those who wait, and the wait
may not be very long for deregulationists. It is now time for the
campaign finance reformers to be deflated and dejected, and to
expect that the coherence likely to emerge from the Supreme
Court in the next decade will severely limit the constitutional
options for regulation.
